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TRADEMARKS AND THE INTERNET: 
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL IP 
DISPUTES BY UNILATERAL 
APPLICATION OF U.S. LAWS 
Richard L. Garnett* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n this Symposium, we have had contributions from a num-
ber of scholars addressing the issue of how to resolve 
transnational, intellectual property (IP) disputes.  According to 
one view, the development of internationally accepted principles 
of both jurisdiction and applicable law would assist courts in 
selecting a single forum and governing law in an IP dispute.1  It 
is hoped that such an approach would achieve uniform out-
comes from national courts with respect to a single set of facts.  
A more direct solution to transnational IP disputes might be to 
harmonize the national substantive laws themselves, so that 
each state applies the same law of, for example copyright, re-
gardless of where the events occurred or the nationality of the 
parties.2  In the case of territorially delimited IP rights, how-
ever, harmonization of domestic law is only a partial remedy 
because of the competing national interests involved.3     
  
 * Associate Professor, Law School, The University of Melbourne, Austra-
lia.  The author is an Adviser to the American Law Institute in its project on 
transnational intellectual property adjudication and is also a member of the 
Australian Government delegation to the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law (Convention on Choice of Court Agreements). 
1 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL 
DISPUTES (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES, Draft 
No. 3].  The Brooklyn Law School Symposium focused on Preliminary Draft 
No. 3, which was made available to the participants in October 2004. 
 2. JAMES J. FAWCETT & PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 460 (1998).  
 3. For example, even if Australia and the United States had identical 
trademark laws, the fact that each country grants its own trademark right for 
its sphere of territorial operation means that two rights-holders, one under 
U.S. law and one under Australian law, would still conflict when one rights-
holder seeks to use its mark in the other’s territory. 
I 
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What may be needed, more dramatically, is the creation of a 
single, transnational, IP right similar to the European Union 
(EU) Community Trademark4 and the proposed EU Community 
Patent.5  Outside of Europe, however, there has been little pro-
gress towards this objective.  In fact, the current differences in 
national trademark laws suggest that achievement of such a 
goal in the near future is unlikely.   
Recently, however, other forces of convergence have emerged 
in the area of intellectual property.  First, the placement of IP 
matters within the treaty framework of the World Trade Or-
ganization, via the development of multinational panels to re-
view member compliance with the TRIPS Agreement,6 is likely 
to have a harmonizing effect on domestic laws.7  Second, the 
emergence of borderless information technology has challenged 
the notion of regulation by disparate domestic laws that, at 
least with respect to IP, are often territorial in application.  In 
particular, the volume and intensity of transnational conflicts 
has increased with the rise of the Internet, and these disputes 
are exposing the inadequacy of existing domestic IP laws.8   
The object of this paper is to explore a “third path” between 
the conflict of laws and harmonization approaches, which can 
be described as the unilateral application of domestic law to 
  
 4. Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community 
Trademark 1994 O.J. (L 1) 1. 
 5. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Pat-
ent, COM(00)412 final at 177.  
 6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).  
 7. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL 
DISPUTES 20 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2004) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES, 
Draft No. 2].  
 8. International arbitration mechanisms are emerging to address this 
inadequacy.  See, e.g., Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Num-
bers [hereinafter ICANN], Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 
available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (Oct. 24, 
1999) [hereinafter UDRP] (under which approved arbitration panels apply a 
form of supra-national law not necessarily tied to any domestic legal system).  
December 1, 1999 marked the first day that complaints could be lodged under 
the policy.  ICANN, Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the 
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, available at http://www. 
icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). 
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transnational disputes.  The context in which unilateralism has 
been most manifest is in the area of Internet trademark dis-
putes; this will be the focus of the present discussion.9  In par-
ticular, I argue that a unilateralist approach, as evidenced by 
the U.S. application of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act (ACPA) of 1999,10 is appropriate in cases involving 
cyber-piracy, but not in situations where only good faith use of a 
trademark is involved.  In Part II, I briefly discuss general ju-
risdictional and applicable law issues and review some pre-
ACPA decisions.  Part III looks at the application of ACPA in 
two contexts: cyber-piracy cases and those cases involving a 
good faith use of a trademark right.  This Article then concludes 
with a discussion of the U.S. treatment of foreign rights-
holders.   
It is important to clarify what is meant by “unilateralism” in 
this Article.  The idea here is that courts apply national trade-
mark or unfair competition law to disputes with a substantial 
foreign element, without adequate regard for, or consideration 
of, the dispute’s transnational nature.  While traditional conflict 
of laws analysis imposes preconditions and restraints at both 
the jurisdictional and applicable law stages, under a unilateral-
ist approach, there are minimal hurdles imposed.  Many na-
tional conflict of laws systems are premised, at least in part, on 
respect for the adjudicative competence and territorial sover-
eignty of other states.11  Accordingly, the jurisdictional and ap-
plicable law principles of most countries attempt to accommo-
date the interests of foreign states and defendants, while pre-
serving the interests of the forum state and its local residents.12  
  
 9. While the presence of unilateralism in the area of Internet trademark 
disputes may simply be a reflection of the volume of such cases in recent 
years, it may also be part of a broader trend that will appear in other contexts. 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1999) (Section 1125 is generally referred to as the 
Lanham Act). 
 11. See 1 ALBERT V. DICEY & JOHN H.C. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 5–7 (Lawrence Collins ed., 13th ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
DICEY & MORRIS] (describing concept of “comity”).  The idea that a court 
should apply the law or seek the jurisdiction with the “closest connection” to 
the parties and the dispute has been increasingly influential in jurisdiction 
and applicable law doctrine in Europe and the United States.  See EUGENE F. 
SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 114 (3rd ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
SCOLES & HAY]. 
 12. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
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It follows, therefore, that it would be inappropriate for a na-
tional court to simply assume jurisdiction, or apply local law in 
a transnational case, without adequately assessing the relevant 
foreign interests. 
In the context of transnational Internet disputes involving 
trademarks, however, courts and legislatures have, on occasion, 
sought to apply domestic law without the usual preconditions or 
restraints imposed to protect foreign interests.13  The applica-
tion of ACPA by U.S. courts is one such example of this kind of 
unilateralism.14  The consequences of such an approach are two-
fold.  First, trademark laws of certain states are likely to have a 
wide, possibly global, impact at the expense of other states, 
whose capacity to apply their own laws and protect their own 
citizens is restrained.  In effect, a supranational trademark re-
gime may be created, not pursuant to a transnational process of 
harmonization but, rather, due to unilateral national action.  
Second, such action may inspire retaliation by other states as 
they also choose to abandon their jurisdictional and applicable 
law methodologies in favor of direct, unilateral application of 
local laws to cases with a foreign element.  These consequences 
would have a seriously detrimental effect on the global trade-
mark system as a whole. 
A. The Kinds of Transnational Disputes that Arise from the Use 
of Trademarks on the Internet 
A common factual context which has given rise to this prob-
lem is where a local plaintiff, who is the holder of trademark 
rights under the law of the forum state, brings an action 
against a foreign party who has no physical presence in the fo-
rum.  The foreign-based party operates an Internet Web site, 
typically hosted on a foreign server, that uses the plaintiff’s 
mark in the text of its site and/or as its domain name.  The fo-
  
 13. Note that the problem of the clash between domestic trademark laws 
and the global Internet domain name system has been discussed widely in the 
scholarly literature.  See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Essay: (National) 
Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name System, 21 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 495 (2000). 
 14. It should be noted, however, that evidence of this unilateral tendency is 
not confined to the practice of the United States and, even in those legal sys-
tems where evidence of the approach is found, it is not an approach that is 
consistently or universally applied. 
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rum court is confronted with two questions in this context: 
whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over the foreign defen-
dant and, if so, what law to apply to the action.  While both in-
quiries have the capacity to recognize and accommodate foreign 
interests, in a number of cases, these interests are diminished. 
In considering the degree to which national courts should 
take into account foreign interests in Internet trademark litiga-
tion, it is helpful to identify a number of variations on the broad 
example given above.  The first situation is where a plaintiff 
and defendant are each using the same or similar mark on the 
Internet within their specific national territories, under the 
protection of local trademark law, and are separately targeting 
a predominantly local customer audience.  A second variation is 
where the plaintiff and defendant are using the same mark, 
again protected by local law in their respective places of resi-
dence but one party (or both) is soliciting customers outside its 
borders in order to establish an international market for its 
products.  A third situation is where the defendant is using an 
internationally-known mark on the Internet, either with the 
intent to exploit the plaintiff’s goodwill for the benefit of its own 
business or to merely extort money from the trademark owner; 
this is the classic “cybersquatting” situation. 
In considering the application of domestic rules of personal 
jurisdiction and applicable law in Internet trademark cases, it 
is important to distinguish between the differing factual matri-
ces referred to above.  A more unilateral or expansive approach 
to applying national law with less regard for foreign interests is 
arguably more defensible in the case of a person using a mark 
for cybersquatting than in the case of a person using the mark, 
in good faith, in predominantly local trade.  Consequently, 
while it will be argued in this Article that foreign interests and 
elements should be taken into account in Internet trademark 
litigation, not all interests are entitled to the same degree of 
deference. 
II.  FIRST THINGS FIRST: JURISDICTION AND TERRITORIAL SCOPE 
A. Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Cases 
In the United States, there is evidence of both unilateralism 
and restraint in cases involving trademark and unfair competi-
tion claims arising from Internet activity.  A clear example of 
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U.S. restraint is the test used by U.S. courts to determine per-
sonal jurisdiction in Internet disputes.15     
U.S. courts recognize two broad categories of personal juris-
diction in suits against foreign defendants, namely, “specific” 
and “general” jurisdiction.16  Regarding specific jurisdiction in 
the Internet context, a defendant will be found to have the req-
uisite “minimum contacts” if it purposefully directed electronic 
activity into the state with the intent of engaging in business or 
other interactions with forum residents.17  Mere establishment 
of an interactive Web site, through which the defendant has the 
capacity to exchange information with forum residents is insuf-
ficient; there must be a clear intention to target and solicit cus-
tomers from such persons.18   
This test has generally proven effective in protecting foreign 
defendants in Internet trademark cases from excessive expo-
sure to U.S. liability.  For example, in a recent Third Circuit 
decision, Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A.,19 a Spanish com-
pany was found not to have targeted residents in New Jersey 
where the content of its Web site was entirely in Spanish, prices 
were in Pesetas or Euros, merchandise could only be shipped to 
  
 15. It is not the purpose of this Article to examine in detail the law on per-
sonal jurisdiction but, rather, to demonstrate that the current U.S. jurisdic-
tional tests are protective of the rights of foreign defendants and of the “adju-
dicative space” of foreign tribunals. 
 16. Specific jurisdiction is based on the “minimum contacts” between the 
defendant’s actions and the forum state.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 480 U.S. 102, 108–09 (1987).  General jurisdiction exists, regard-
less of the cause of action, where the defendant is engaged in “continuous and 
systematic” activity in the forum state.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., 
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).   
 17. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 
(4th Cir. 2002); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 
(6th Cir. 2002); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(passive Web site insufficient for personal jurisdiction); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cy-
bersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997) (same as Mink).  
 18. See ALS Scan, Inc., 293 F.3d at 714.  For the contrary view that the 
mere availability and use of an interactive, transaction-oriented Web site is 
sufficient for personal jurisdiction, see Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 
293 F.3d 506, 510–13 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
 19. See generally Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 
2003).  
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addresses within Spain, and it was not possible for U.S. resi-
dents to register with the defendant’s online club.20 
Another basis for specific jurisdiction under U.S. law is the 
“effects” test, which provides that a U.S. court may exercise ju-
risdiction where a foreign defendant intentionally aims its con-
duct at the forum state.21  This test has been applied in the 
Internet trademark context by the Ninth Circuit to secure ju-
risdiction over a defendant who registered a trademark belong-
ing to a plaintiff as a domain name, and then tried to sell it 
back to the company in an extortive fashion.22  Such clear and 
deliberate cyber-piracy was considered by the court to have 
been intentionally directed at the forum state.23  This basis of 
jurisdiction is likely to be most useful in the case of abusive or 
bad faith uses of a mark. 
U.S. law also recognizes personal jurisdiction over foreign en-
tities where “general” jurisdiction is found to exist.  In this 
situation, the plaintiff’s claim may be unrelated to the defen-
dant’s contacts with the forum.  Consequently, a more onerous 
test applies than for specific jurisdiction; namely, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant has “continuous and systematic” 
contacts with the forum.24  Satisfaction of such a test in the 
Internet context will require a defendant to have clearly tar-
geted forum residents with its Web site, such as where the de-
fendant engaged in business with such persons and entered into 
contracts there.25  
B. Territorial Scope of the Applicable Law 
Once a U.S. court has determined that personal jurisdiction 
exists in an action involving foreign entities, it must then decide 
which law to apply in adjudicating the dispute.  In the context 
of general torts, many U.S. courts apply a version of the “inter-
ests analysis” doctrine, that is, they identify the state that has 
the greatest interest in having its law applied to the particular 
  
 20. Id. at 454. 
 21. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984).  
 22. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411–12.  
 25. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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issue and weigh the competing entitlements of the other state.26  
In theory, U.S. law would only apply where the court found that 
the U.S. interest prevailed over that of the foreign state. 
In trademark litigation, however, this traditional approach 
for selecting the applicable law has not been followed.  Instead, 
where a plaintiff seeks relief for trademark infringement under 
the Lanham Act,27 courts examine whether the case fits within 
the territorial scope of the Act, rather than follow a choice of 
law analysis.28  Consequently, the only law that is relevant be-
fore the court is the Lanham Act, which is either found to apply, 
or not, as a matter of statutory construction.  
It is not entirely clear why traditional applicable law analysis 
has been avoided by U.S. courts in the trademark context, al-
though writers have noted that this is consistent with the ap-
proach taken in other countries based on the concept of lex loci 
protectionis (the law of the place where protection is claimed).29  
Pursuant to this view, courts are directed in IP cases to apply 
the law invoked by the plaintiff to the exclusion of any other 
possible law.  Such an approach, however, does not necessarily 
mean that foreign elements and interests cannot be considered 
in the inquiry.  It would only be, for example, where U.S. courts 
were to apply the Lanham Act to the conduct of a foreign defen-
dant, with little or no link to the United States, that claims of 
excessive unilateralism could be made. 
The historical record of the U.S. courts in applying the 
Lanham Act to foreign commerce is interesting.  In Steele v. Bu-
lova Watch Co., the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Lanham 
Act to the defendant, who made watches under a local trade-
mark in Mexico, and subsequently sold them in the United 
States in breach of the plaintiff’s mark.30  The court gave three 
  
 26. The majority of states adopt an analysis derived from the American 
Law Institute’s Second Restatement.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 6 (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; SCOLES & HAY, supra 
note 11, at 79–102. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1999). 
 28. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283–84 (1952). 
 29. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the Protection of 
Trademarks, Paper Presented at the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property (Jan. 
30–31, 2001) (WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/4 2001), available at http:// 
www.wipo.int/pil-forum/en/documents.  
 30. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. at 285. 
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reasons for applying U.S. law: first, the defendant was an 
American citizen and accordingly, Congress had wide power to 
legislate with respect to his acts; second, the effects of the de-
fendant’s conduct were felt in the United States, where some of 
the infringing items were sold; and third, at the time of the 
court hearing, the defendant had lost its Mexican trademark 
rights so there no longer existed any conflict between U.S. and 
foreign trademark rights.31 
While courts in the pre-Internet era were cautious in giving 
the Act an extraterritorial operation where the defendant was 
not a U.S. citizen, the advent of new technologies appears to 
have altered this position dramatically.32  Indeed, it should come 
as no surprise that technology, which renders the difference 
between the domestic and the foreign illusory,33 should expose 
the limitations of the Bulova test.  There is a much greater op-
portunity with the Internet for the domestic use of a trademark 
to spill across borders and impact commerce elsewhere.34  Yet, 
there seems to be no scope under Bulova to apply U.S. law 
where the defendant is a foreign national and, in addition, in 
the Internet context, it may be very difficult to precisely quan-
tify the degree of harm on the plaintiff’s U.S. commerce.   
Furthermore, the Bulova test draws no distinction between 
the various types of trademark infringement in terms of the 
defendant’s conduct and intent.  Cyber-piracy arguably stands 
apart from instances where a party merely uses a mark on the 
Internet to expand into international markets.  However, ac-
cording to Bulova, principles of territorial connection are ap-
plied in a neutral fashion to determine the scope of operation of 
U.S. trademark law, without regard to whether the defendant 
  
 31. Id. at 286–89.  
 32. In the majority of U.S. decisions not involving Internet infringement, 
courts have been reluctant to grant relief under the Lanham Act unless the 
defendant is a U.S. citizen and there is a substantial effect on U.S. commerce.  
See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 643–44 (2d Cir. 
1956) (refusing to apply the Act where the U.S. owner of a U.S. mark sought 
to restrain the use of the mark in Canada by a Canadian resident who owned 
the Canadian registration for the same mark and was selling similar products 
there).  
 33. See generally Uta Kohl, Eggs, Jurisdiction and the Internet, 51 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 555 (2002) (discussing the limitations of the Bulova test). 
 34. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 
1240–42 (1998).  
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was acting in good faith or abusively.  Given that bad faith use 
of marks has increased enormously since the advent of the 
Internet, a test based on pure territorial connection is outdated 
and inadequate.35  The Bulova principle does remain useful, 
however, where a defendant only intends to use a mark within 
a limited geographical area, and has acquired local rights’ pro-
tection for that purpose.  It would be unjust if such a person 
were unduly penalized for unforeseeable and uncontrollable 
spillover of its use into other states.   
Not surprisingly then, U.S. courts have responded to the rise 
of cybersquatting by extending the scope of the Lanham Act so 
that it may apply to both foreign and U.S. defendants, even 
where there has been a less than substantial effect on U.S. 
commerce.  The courts appear to have decided that a bad faith 
user has, by virtue of its conduct, forfeited any right to exemp-
tion from the application of U.S. trademark law.36  Unfortu-
nately though, in the judiciary’s enthusiasm to catch cyber-
squatters through expansive application of U.S. law, some “col-
lateral damage” has occurred.  In particular, there have been 
cases where a foreign entity, with little or no connection to the 
United States, using its mark in good faith within its territory, 
has been held subject to the Lanham Act.37 
In one notorious case, Cable News Network L.P. v. 
CNNews.com,38 a Chinese resident who registered a domain 
name for a site accessible in the United States was found to be 
subject to the Act, despite the fact that his site was a news ser-
  
 35. To some extent, this outcome is a result of the policies adopted by 
ICANN for registration in the generic top-level domains, such as (.com), where 
domains have been allocated on a “first come, first served” basis without any 
regard for whether the registrant has a right to use such a name under 
trademark law.  See ICANN, Top-Level Domains, at http://www.icann.org/tlds 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2005). This approach is in contrast to the procedure 
adopted in most national registries for the grant of country-level domains, 
which require some prior connection between the registrant and the name.  
See, e.g., infra note 65.  
 36. See, e.g., Hollywood Entertainment Corp. v. Hollywood Entertainment, 
Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6466, *11 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 1999); see also Toys 
“R” Us, Inc. v. Abir, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22431, *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 
1997).  
 37. See, e.g., Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 
2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. 
Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d in part, 56 Fed. Appx. 599 (4th Cir. 2003).   
 38. Cable News Network L.P., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 517–18. 
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vice entirely in the Chinese language, with 99.5% of its users 
located in Chinese cities, and which transacted no business 
within the United States.  The court applied the Act for a num-
ber of reasons.  Generally, it argued the Act was applicable be-
cause of the global nature of the Internet.  It also found the sig-
nificant number of Chinese speakers in the United States, and 
the fact that the (.com) domain is essentially an American top-
level domain, to be relevant.  Last, it noted that CNN is an in-
ternationally famous mark.  In the court’s view, the accessibil-
ity of the mark in the United States and, accordingly, the risk of 
confusion with the plaintiff’s mark, created an effect on U.S. 
commerce.39 
This case is problematic because there was no evidence that 
any Chinese speakers in the United States knew of the site, let 
alone accessed it, and so the risk of confusion with the U.S. 
mark seemed minute.  In addition, the case did not reveal bad 
faith use on the part of the defendant: he conducted an almost 
exclusively local business within China, in the Chinese lan-
guage, and directed his business at many people who, likely, 
were not aware of the U.S. company’s mark.40 
In such a case, there is a good argument for applying the Bu-
lova principles to shield the foreign defendant from U.S. law, in 
the same way that U.S. jurisdictional principles have been ap-
plied to protect foreign interests in international trademark 
litigation.41  Such an application would accord with the views of 
European scholars who have advocated a “co-existence” ap-
proach to cross-border Internet trademark disputes.42  Under 
such a doctrine, only where the foreign user is making an “un-
fair use” of the mark, such as by cybersquatting, blatant imita-
tion, or intentional confusion, would the use be prohibited.43  
  
 39. Id.  
 40. Note that on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
expressly vacated the District Court’s finding that the defendant had engaged 
in bad faith.  Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 56 Fed. Appx. 599, 
603 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished).  
 41. See supra, Part I.A.  
 42. See, e.g., Torsten Bettinger & Dorothee Thum, Territorial Trademark 
Rights in the Global Village--International Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and 
Substantive Law for Trademark Disputes on the Internet (Part One) 31 IIC 
162 (2000) and (Part Two) 31 IIC 285 (2000).  
 43. Id. at 300–02.  See also WIPO, Joint Recommendation Concerning Pro-
visions on the Protection of Marks and Other Industrial Property Rights in 
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Such a view recognizes the legitimate competing interests of 
mark-holders and denies the right of a state to unilaterally im-
pose its law outside of the bad faith context.  The United States, 
however, has not chosen to follow the co-existence approach.  
Rather, it responded to the cyber-piracy problem by enacting 
ACPA.  The effect of this legislation on cross-border Internet 
trademark litigation is considered in the next section. 
III. THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
(ACPA) 
ACPA is a globally unique piece of legislation in at least two 
respects.  First, the Act creates a new statutory tort of cyber-
piracy whereby a trademark owner may bring an action against 
a person who has registered a domain name with the bad faith 
intent to profit from the mark.44  Second, ACPA creates a new 
basis of in rem jurisdiction for trademark owners.45  As an alter-
native to bringing a personal action against a defendant, the 
plaintiff may proceed in rem against the offending domain 
name in the judicial district in which the domain name regis-
trar or domain name registry is located.  This in rem jurisdic-
tion is available for cyber-piracy, trademark infringement, and 
dilution claims. 
The in rem jurisdiction provision is especially significant be-
cause Verisign, the exclusive worldwide registry for all domain 
names in the (.com), (.org) and (.net) top-level domains, is lo-
cated in Virginia.  Hence, even though registrars exist in other 
states and have the authority to allocate these top-level do-
mains, Verisign retains the ability to transfer ownership or can-
cel a name.  Consequently, a holder of a U.S. trademark will be 
able to use in rem jurisdiction to sue a top-level domain in Vir-
  
Signs, on the Internet, Arts. 2 & 3, available at http://www.wipo.int/about-
ip/en/development_iplaw/pub845.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) (allowing a 
defendant to make a “restrained use” of a mark, which means any use other 
than one intended to have a “commercial effect” in a country); Annette Kur, 
Use of Trademarks on the Internet: the WIPO Recommendations 33 IIC 41, 43–
46 (2002).  
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (1999). 
 45. § 1125(d)(2)(A). 
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ginia regardless of the location of the registrar from which the 
name was allocated.46   
Two preliminary comments should be made about the legisla-
tion.  First cyber-piracy, as was mentioned above, is one of the 
least defensible forms of trademark infringement.  Conse-
quently, a strong case exists for broad application of U.S. law to 
foreign infringers to deter and punish such conduct.  Second, 
the drafters of ACPA appear to have been concerned not only 
with the difficulty of establishing personal jurisdiction, but also, 
the serious problem of enforcement of U.S. court orders.  En-
forcement is difficult because the relief typically sought in 
trademark infringement cases is an injunction requiring a de-
fendant to cease the infringing activity, and such relief is rarely 
capable of recognition and enforcement as a foreign judgment.47   
It is arguable that the effect of ACPA in rem jurisdiction in 
cyber-piracy cases involving the top-level domain names is to 
establish the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia as the exclusive global forum for such disputes and the 
Lanham Act as the exclusive applicable law.  While some com-
mentators have rejected this outcome as undesirable in all cases 
of trademark infringement,48 the present author sees justifica-
tion for a wide application of U.S. law in the context of abusive 
uses and registrations.  Given the problem of enforcement men-
tioned above, the ACPA approach, which completely dispenses 
with any need to consider foreign interests or elements in the 
litigation before applying U.S. law, is clearly valid in cases 
where egregious or bad faith infringement has occurred.  More-
over, it is important to note that the in rem provisions of the 
statute do not apply in all Internet trademark cases, for exam-
ple where the defendant has a domain registered in the coun-
  
 46. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–(II) (The right to proceed in rem, however, also 
depends upon the mark owner showing (a) that personal jurisdiction would 
not be available over a person who would have been a defendant in the civil 
action; or (b) through due diligence that it has not been able to find a person 
who would have been a defendant.).  
 47. See, e.g., UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3 
(1962) (in force in thirty states).  
 48. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling 
New Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483, 487 
(2003); Steven J. Coran, Note, The Anticybersquatting Protection Act’s In Rem 
Provision: Making American Trademark Law the Law of the Internet?, 30 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 169, 170 (2001). 
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try-level domain of another nation.  In such a case, the U.S. 
trademark owner who wishes to bring an action in the United 
States against a foreign defendant for trademark infringement, 
must satisfy both the rules of personal jurisdiction and the ter-
ritorial scope of the Lanham Act, which means that there is 
scope for recognition of foreign interests in such cases.   
On the other hand, the use of ACPA against an innocent for-
eign defendant, who uses a mark in good faith and is protected 
under its local law, is oppressive and does not adequately weigh 
the interests of the local plaintiff and foreign defendant.  It may 
be said in response that the territorial restrictions of the 
Lanham Act must still be satisfied in cases other then cyber-
piracy.  For example, where the defendant used the mark in 
U.S. commerce, recent cases show how slim the contact with the 
United States can be for U.S. law to apply.49  In situations of 
genuine good faith use, the application of ACPA may lead to 
injustice.  
A. ACPA Applied to Cyber-Piracy Cases 
In cyber-piracy cases, the exercise of in rem jurisdiction under 
ACPA has been effective in ceasing the use of domain names 
registered by foreign-based defendants, particularly where such 
persons had little or no connection to the United States.50  The 
threshold requirement for in rem jurisdiction, that a plaintiff 
show that jurisdiction does not exist over the person of the reg-
istrant, also seems easy to satisfy.  For example, in Broad-
Bridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, the court barely referred 
to personal jurisdiction at all, simply noting that the plaintiff 
was unable to serve the domain name registrant because he 
was a foreign resident.51 
Despite the legitimacy of applying the in rem provisions of 
ACPA to cyber-piracy cases, there are signs that some foreign 
courts and domain name registrars are resenting its applica-
  
 49. Cable News Network L.P., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 517–18.  See also Euro-
market Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 833 (N.D. Ill. 
2000). 
 50. See, e.g., Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 
860, 868–69 (E.D. Va. 2000); BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 
F. Supp. 2d 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 51. BroadBridge Media, L.L.C., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 509.  
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tion, particularly where the defendant is a local party with little 
or no connection to the United States.  While this reaction sug-
gests something of a foreign backlash against perceived unilat-
eral application of U.S. law, it may also be said that foreign au-
thorities could be doing more to ensure that their local residents 
do not engage in deliberate conduct that harms U.S. trademark 
owners. 
In GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com,52 a U.S. mark 
owner obtained an order in an ACPA in rem suit directing a 
Korean registrar to transfer a domain name belonging to a Ko-
rean registrant to the U.S. owner on the ground that the name 
violated its U.S. trademark rights.53  The Korean registrant 
then obtained an order from the Korean court restraining the 
registrar from transferring the name on the basis that the U.S. 
court lacked jurisdiction to make such an order.  The U.S. court 
responded by ordering Verisign to cancel the domain name.  
The court noted that although the Korean registrant had no 
contacts with the United States, the Korean registrar was in 
breach of its contract with Verisign by refusing to transfer the 
name.  In addition, the court noted that ACPA in rem jurisdic-
tion had an important policy justification: catching foreign-
registered domain names in the top-level domain that infringe 
upon U.S. trademarks.  Were ACPA in rem jurisdiction not to 
exist, such conduct could not be prevented.54  In fact, the court 
felt that ACPA did not go far enough because foreign regis-
trants could circumvent its provisions by registering domain 
names with local registrars within their respective country-
level domains.55  The court appeared to lament the fact that 
such names are currently out of reach of the U.S. courts.56 
GlobalSantaFe is a good example of why ACPA is needed: 
had it not existed, the U.S. trademark owner would have strug-
gled to obtain personal jurisdiction over a party who was bla-
tantly infringing upon its rights.  In addition, it seems clear 
from the facts that even if a U.S. court had found jurisdiction to 
exist and issued an order requiring the defendant to cease use, 
  
 52. See generally GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp. 
2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 53. Id. at 612. 
 54. Id. at 623. 
 55. Id. at 624. 
 56. Id. at 625. 
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it is very likely that the Korean court would not have enforced 
the order.  Tension between courts and administrative authori-
ties in different countries should be avoided, occasionally, how-
ever, it will have to be endured to protect a trademark owner’s 
rights.  While such action may also lead to other states enacting 
their own version of ACPA,57 if the scope of such legislation is 
limited to bad faith and abusive uses of marks, there is likely to 
be little damage to the international trademark system.   
A similar comment may be made about the case America 
Online, Inc. v. AOL.org.58  In that decision, the court ordered the 
Public Interest Registry in Virginia to transfer a domain name 
to a U.S. corporation, where a foreign registrar had refused to 
do so in violation of an earlier U.S. court order.59  In fact, the 
Chinese registrar transferred the domain name to another reg-
istrar in South Korea in an attempt to avoid enforcement of the 
judgment upon one of its offices in California.60 
Although the decision in America Online is an appropriate 
application of ACPA to that claim, the court also made some 
general comments on the operation of ACPA that are problem-
atic, at least when applied outside the cybersquatting context.  
The court noted that foreign registrants, by choosing a top-level 
domain to register a domain name, had  
chose[n], in effect to play Internet ball in American cyber-
space.  Had they wished to avoid an American ACPA suit and 
transfer order and American jurisdiction altogether, they 
might have chosen to register the infringing domain name in 
top-level domains with solely foreign registries and registrars 
… [R]egistrants choosing the “.org” top-level domain must 
know, or reasonably should have known, that the controlling 
registry for that domain is a U.S. entity located in Virginia 
and that, under the ACPA, a federal court in Virginia would 
ultimately have jurisdiction over any name registered in the 
“.org” top-level domain.61 
  
 57. Zohar Efroni, A Barcelona.com Analysis: Toward a Better Model for 
Adjudication of International Domain Name Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 29, 90 (2003). 
 58. See generally America Online, Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449 
(E.D. Va. 2003). 
 59. Id. at 449.   
 60. Id. at 452–53. 
 61. Id. at 457. 
File: Garnett MACRO.06.08.05.doc Created on: 6/8/2005 1:36 PM Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:26 PM 
2005] TRADEMARKS AND THE INTERNET 941 
 
The court appears to be saying that registration of a domain 
name in the top-level amounts to de facto submission to U.S. 
jurisdiction and law.  The correctness of this view is question-
able given that the only dispute resolution process a registrant 
clearly submits to at the time of registration is the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which is included as a term 
in the registration agreement for the generic top-level do-
mains.62  It is likely that most registrants would simply be un-
aware of the application of ACPA, particularly those who regis-
tered names prior to its enactment in 1999.  It seems a stretch 
to say that such persons have submitted to U.S. law and juris-
diction—rather, it appears that U.S. law has been imposed on 
them. 
B. ACPA Applied to Good Faith Infringements 
Where an action is brought under ACPA against a defendant 
who is making a good faith use of a mark, application of its pro-
visions is particularly problematic, as is shown by 
CNNews.com, discussed above.63  In CNNews.com, there was no 
finding that the defendant sought to do business in the United 
States, or that it used the mark in bad faith, yet it was held 
subject to in rem jurisdiction and stripped of its domain name.64   
It could be said that ACPA would not stop the defendant from 
registering a domain name in the Chinese country-level do-
main.  Such an outcome, however, is at odds with the philoso-
phy of the domain name system, which is to encourage global 
  
 62. See, for example, the clause provided by the registrar 2Tone Domain 
Registration Service, Customer Registration Agreement, at http:// 
www.2tonedomains.com/site/docs/agreement.php (Mar. 14, 2005): 
6. DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE POLICY. If you reserved or registered 
a domain name through us, or transferred a domain name to us from 
another registrar, you agree to be bound the Dispute Policy which is 
incorporated herein and made a part of this Agreement by reference. 
The current version of the Dispute Policy may be found at our web 
site: http://www.icann.org/udrp/urdp.htm.  Please take the time to 
familiarize yourself with such policy.  
Id. 
 63. See generally Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 
2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d in part, 56 Fed. Appx. 599 (4th Cir. 2003) (ACPA 
applied despite slim contacts with the United States). 
 64. Id.  
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use of the generic top-level domains, so that parties can use the 
Internet to reach new markets with their goods and services.65  
If the generic top-level domains were reserved exclusively for 
U.S. trademark owners, then limiting the defendant to a Chi-
nese registry may have been appropriate.66  The U.S. court, 
however, saw the case as entirely one of protecting the interests 
of the local trademark owner even though in this case the de-
gree of harm to the party was very slight.  Perhaps the court 
felt a sense of deference to the plaintiff given the international 
profile and goodwill of its brand.  Nevertheless, the decision is a 
regrettable application of ACPA.   
Two other ACPA in rem cases that did not involve cyber-
piracy on the part of the defendant may be similarly criticized.  
In Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barce-
lona,67 the registrant of a domain name, who was a Spanish citi-
zen but operated a U.S. shelf company (hosted on a Spanish 
server), sought a declaration under ACPA that its use of the 
name did not infringe any trademark rights of the Spanish de-
fendant, the Barcelona City Council.  The provision relied upon 
was the so-called “reverse domain name hijacking” provision of 
ACPA, which allows a domain name owner to sue to recover its 
domain name when a trademark owner has exceeded its author-
  
 65. Note that ICANN has described un-sponsored, generic top-level do-
mains (which includes the .com domain) as operating “under policies estab-
lished by the global Internet community directly through the ICANN proc-
ess….”  Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), at http://www.icann.org/tlds (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2005).  This statement supports the view that the .com domain was 
intended for global, not merely American, use.  In addition, the Generic Top 
level Domain Memorandum of Understanding (February 28, 1997) refers to 
the generic TLDs as “global name resources” which require administration by 
a “global distribution of registrars.”  Establishment of a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding on the Generic Top Level Domain Name Space of the Internet 
Domain Name System (gTLD-MoU), at http://www.gtld-mou.org (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2005). 
 66. For example, in Australia, the domain name registrar for the (.com.au) 
domain will only allocate a domain to an entity that has a commercial connec-
tion with Australia and some trademark or business association with the 
name. In effect, a registrant under the Australian system must be linked to 
the country and have a genuine intent to do business under that name.  Do-
main Name Eligibility and Allocation Rules for the Open 2LDs (2002-07), at 
http://www.auda.org.au/policies/auda-2002-07 (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). 
 67. See generally Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de 
Barcelona, 189 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
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ity by having the name suspended or transferred in arbitration 
proceedings, for example, under the UDRP.68  Here, the Spanish 
mark owner had previously been successful via UDRP proceed-
ings in having the name transferred to it.69 
The U.S. District Court in Barcelona.com refused the regis-
trant’s claim for a declaration, holding that the domain name 
infringed upon the City Council’s rights under Spanish trade-
mark law.70  However, the Fourth Circuit reversed this decision, 
holding that foreign trademark law was irrelevant to a regis-
trant’s suit to recover a domain name under ACPA.71  According 
to the court, U.S. trademark law had exclusive operation in 
such a case, and since the word “Barcelona” was not protected 
under U.S. law, the registrant was entitled to keep the domain 
name. 
The first interesting point about the case is that it was the 
domain name registrant who brought the action to overcome an 
unfavorable UDRP decision that labeled it a cybersquatter.  
Consequently, the case would seem to encourage cybersquatters 
(whether U.S. or foreign) to use ACPA against legitimate for-
eign mark owners.  This outcome is rather ironic given that the 
original purpose of ACPA was to deter cyber-piracy. 
Second, the dispute at issue had almost no connection with 
the United States: it involved two Spanish entities, concerned a 
Spanish city, and was hosted on a Spanish server.  While the 
UDRP found for the City Council on the basis of Spanish law, 
the Fourth Circuit ignored this finding on the basis that only 
U.S. law was relevant.  Surely this was a case where, under 
U.S. choice of law principles, a court would have considered that 
it had no interest in applying U.S. law given the lack of any 
meaningful U.S. connections.72  This case suggests that a review 
of ACPA is required to prevent U.S. law from being unilaterally 
and exorbitantly applied.73 
  
 68. See Remedies; Infringement; Innocent Infringement by Printers and 
Publishers, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (1999); UDRP, supra note 8 and accom-
panying text. 
 69. Barcelona.com, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d at 370–71. 
 70. Id. at 372, 376.  
 71. Barcelona.com, Inc., 330 F.3d at 628. 
 72. See supra, Part II.A. 
 73. See, e.g., Efroni, supra note 57, at 85–91, 117. 
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The most recent ACPA decision against a foreign defendant, 
Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc., also involved an action by a 
U.S. domain name registrant against a foreign trademark 
owner in circumstances where the registrant appeared to have 
engaged in cybersquatting.74  The difference between this case 
and Barcelona.com, however, is that the foreign trademark 
owner had obtained a judgment for infringement from a foreign 
court.  Hawes concerned a U.S. plaintiff who registered the do-
main name “lorealcomplaints.com” with Network Solutions, Inc. 
(NSI) in 1999.75  L’Oreal, a French corporation, sued Hawes for 
trademark infringement in France, and, after NSI produced the 
registration certificate to the French court, the court ordered 
the transfer of the domain name to L’Oreal.76  Hawes then sued 
L’Oreal in Virginia under the reverse domain name hijacking 
provision of ACPA, arguing that his use of the domain name 
was not unlawful, and requesting that it be transferred back to 
him.   
The Fourth Circuit allowed the plaintiff’s claim but stated 
that it did not want to “imply any disrespect of [the] French 
court.”77  In its view, jurisdiction under ACPA was not qualified 
or limited by the fact of pending actions in a foreign court in the 
same way that UDRP proceedings would not preclude an ACPA 
suit.78  Three comments may be made about this decision.  First, 
this case continues the trend, seen in CNNews.com and Barce-
lona.com, of allowing ACPA to be used by persons with no good 
faith interest in the mark to attack the rights of foreign trade-
mark owners.  This trend is unfortunate and injurious to com-
ity.  Second, the court’s comment that the French proceeding 
was merely “pending” is not strictly accurate; in fact the matter 
had already been resolved.79  Arguably, at the time the U.S. pro-
ceedings were filed, the interference with the French court’s 
process was even greater.  It was not as if both parties had filed 
conflicting actions in different countries at the same time or, as 
in GlobalSantaFe, one party had filed retaliatory proceedings in 
  
 74. See generally Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc., 337 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 
2003). 
 75. Id. at 379.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 386. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 379. 
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a foreign country after an ACPA action had been brought 
against it.   
The French court, seised first, had determined that a breach 
of its trademark law had occurred and such judgment was enti-
tled to deference in the United States on the ground of comity, 
as occurs with most foreign judgments in U.S. courts.80  Instead, 
the effect of allowing the ACPA action to proceed was to render 
the foreign trademark rights practically useless, as the regis-
trant was reinstated as owner of the domain name because his 
registration did not infringe U.S. law.   
Third, the Court drew a questionable analogy between foreign 
court proceedings and UDRP actions.  It stated that neither 
proceeding was entitled to deference by a U.S. court when ap-
plying ACPA.81  The alleged similarity between these two types 
of proceedings is misplaced, given that, in the case of UDRP 
decisions, the UDRP Policy expressly provides that court pro-
ceedings may be brought to override a decision of a UDRP 
panel.82  By contrast, there is no international agreement or pol-
icy that elevates the decisions of one national court above an-
other in trademark litigation.  Indeed, foreign courts issuing 
judgments with respect to their own locally-granted trademarks 
should be entitled to greater deference because they are pro-
nouncing on matters that cannot be adjudicated by a U.S. court.  
Indeed, as mentioned above, U.S. courts have historically and 
routinely enforced foreign judgments on the basis of comity.83  
This result is the strongest example to date of the trend of uni-
lateral application of national law in the United States; this is 
the first case where foreign trademark rights have been ex-
pressly overridden by application of ACPA. 
C. Is ACPA Going in the Right Direction? 
An effective revolution in thinking has occurred since Bulova 
with respect to international trademark disputes.  While Bu-
  
 80. U.S. law has a long tradition of respect and comity towards judgments 
of foreign countries.  See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).  See also 
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS ACT, supra note 47; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND), supra note 26, § 98. 
 81. Hawes, 337 F.3d at 386.  
 82. UDRP, supra note 8, ¶ 3(b). 
 83. See supra note 80. 
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lova and its progeny encouraged extreme deference to foreign 
defendants in the application of U.S. trademark law, recent 
practice has altered this position.  It is clear that the Internet 
has exposed the inadequacy of the Bulova criteria through the 
penetration of the U.S. market by foreign marks and the emer-
gence of practices such as cybersquatting.  Such new develop-
ments clearly demand a greater willingness to reach persons 
outside the United States with U.S. law than was previously 
the case.  Consequently, since ACPA came into force, courts 
have applied U.S. trademark law more liberally to foreign de-
fendants, a legitimate approach given the high prevalence of 
cybersquatting in the generic top-level domains and the diffi-
culty of enforcing court ordered injunctive relief in other coun-
tries.  Where, however, the defendant has few contacts with the 
United States and is carrying on business in good faith under 
the mark, with a strong local orientation and backed by the pro-
tection of a local trademark, application of U.S. law through 
ACPA is harder to justify.   
This trend is noticeable in the CNNews.com case, as well as 
in more recent decisions, such as Barcelona.com and Hawes, 
where domain name owners who appear to have registered 
names in suspicious circumstances have been allowed to keep 
such names despite their breach of UDRP Policy or foreign 
trademark rights.84  It would be ironic indeed if ACPA were to 
lead U.S. courts to gain a reputation for facilitating cybersquat-
ting against foreign trademark owners, yet this seems a clear 
possibility under the current law, and a matter that requires 
serious legislative attention in the United States. 
Nevertheless, the view that ACPA should be repealed in favor 
of increased deference to UDRP arbitration must be rejected.  
First, while it is true that the UDRP does provide relief against 
cyber-piracy, its decisions and procedures have been criticized.85  
  
 84. In Barcelona.com, Inc., a domain name owner was found by a UDRP 
panel to have registered the name in bad faith.  Barcelona.com, Inc., 189 F. 
Supp. 2d at 373.  In Hawes, a French Court found a domain name owner’s 
registration to infringe a French trademark.  Hawes, 337 F.3d at 379. 
 85. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: 
Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 191 (2002); Robert A. Badgley, Improving ICANN in Ten Easy Steps: 
Ten Suggestions for ICANN to Improve its Anticybersquatting Arbitration 
System, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 109, 113–14 (2001). 
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Second, it may be argued that a U.S. trademark owner should 
be entitled to invoke U.S. jurisdiction to gain redress under its 
own law, particularly where deliberate and bad faith harm is 
being caused.  Furthermore, for a scheme of greater UDRP def-
erence to work internationally, all states would have to sign a 
treaty agreeing to limit grounds of domestic judicial review.  In 
the absence of such a treaty, national courts would retain the 
power to overturn a UDRP decision at the expense, for example, 
of a U.S. trademark owner’s rights.   
As a final point, the recent decision in Microsoft Corp. v. Lin-
dows.com, Inc.86 suggests that technology may now be available 
to assist U.S. courts in curtailing the application of U.S. law in 
Internet trademark cases.  In Lindows.com, the availability of 
inexpensive commercial software to block users according to 
geographical location was noted.87  If such software is precise 
and effective there seems to be no reason why U.S. courts can-
not issue orders under ACPA with limited territorial effect.  
That is, instead of forcing the registrant to transfer or cancel a 
domain name, it could be entitled to use such a name in all 
countries where it has rights of use and only precluded from 
using the mark in the United States.  Such an approach would 
arguably balance the competing interests in cases of parallel 
good faith use of marks in separate territories more effectively 
than the current position under ACPA. 
IV. TURNING THE TABLES:  U.S. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN 
TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
Another possible reason for the expansive application of U.S. 
law in Internet trademark cases is that, traditionally, U.S. 
courts have not enforced foreign trademark rights.  In particu-
lar, they have not allowed a party to sue in the United States 
for infringement or to question the validity of a foreign-
registered mark.  The main reason for this position was the “act 
of state” doctrine, which maintains that a U.S. court does not 
review the acts of foreign government officials acting within 
their own territory because of the consequent danger of conflict 
  
 86. Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004).  
 87. Id. 
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between the court and the administrative and judicial officers of 
the foreign state.88  
Most courts examining infringement of foreign registered 
trademarks have refused to entertain the claims.89  The decision 
in Lindows.com, however, suggests a possible willingness to 
reconsider this position.   In that matter, Microsoft had ob-
tained an injunction in a Dutch court which restrained Lin-
dows.com from selling and distributing its software in the 
Netherlands and ordered it to render its site inaccessible to us-
ers in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.90  Microsoft 
then filed a second suit in the Netherlands alleging that Lin-
dows.com had failed to comply with the original order.91  Lin-
dows.com approached the U.S. courts, seeking to enjoin Micro-
soft from pursuing the foreign litigation and seeking a 
declaration that the Dutch order was unenforceable in the 
United States.92 
The court refused to grant both forms of relief because to do 
so would amount to “[interference] with the judicial proceedings 
of other sovereign nations.”93  The court noted that the Paris 
Convention,94 to which the United States is a party, is premised 
upon national trademark law having territorial, rather than 
extraterritorial, operation.  If the U.S. court granted the relief 
sought, it would completely nullify the foreign trademark rights 
and, in effect, superimpose U.S. law upon a foreign country.  
Such a conclusion would not only be injurious to comity but also 
to the holder of the foreign trademark rights, in this case Mi-
crosoft. 
  
 88. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 
(1964); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 
1956).   
 89. See, e.g., Alcar Group, Inc. v. Corporate Performance Sys., Ltd., 109 F. 
Supp. 2d 948, 952 (N.D. Ill. 2000).  Cf. V & S Vin & Sprit Aktiebolag v. Han-
son, 146 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802  (E.D. Va. 2001) (suggesting that it would have 
jurisdiction to hear a claim in relation to a foreign trademark where a plaintiff 
sought a worldwide injunction). 
 90. Lindows.com, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1223. 
 94. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 
1883, revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
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Lindows.com is a good example of respect for foreign trade-
mark rights in the Internet context and should encourage U.S. 
courts to rethink their traditional resistance to adjudicating 
claims based on foreign-registered trademarks.  The current 
U.S. position is harder to justify as multi-territorial infringe-
ments of IP rights become increasingly common.  For example, 
a single Web site can infringe upon the trademark laws of many 
states; it would be sensible for a plaintiff to be able to consoli-
date all of his claims in a single forum with significant savings 
in time and costs.95   
The current approach, perhaps unwittingly, encourages uni-
lateral application of U.S. trademark law.  Since a plaintiff 
cannot secure recovery for infringements of its foreign marks 
based on conduct outside the United States, a U.S. court may be 
more easily persuaded by an injured rights-holder to “fill the 
gap” by applying U.S. law to such conduct.  Where the plaintiff 
is a U.S. resident who would be forced to sue abroad to vindi-
cate its foreign rights, this risk seems particularly great.  The 
record of U.S. courts in applying the Lanham Act to foreign de-
fendants, particularly in Internet transactions, lends some sup-
port to this assertion.  By contrast, if U.S. courts were to adopt 
a more receptive approach to foreign trademark claims, in line 
with the view of the court in the Lindows.com case, the incen-
tive for unilateralist and extraterritorial application of national 
law may diminish.  As has been noted,96 wide and expansive 
application of national trademark law is likely to be more inju-
rious to relations with foreign states than adjudicating upon 
foreign trademark rights.97   
  
 95. ALI PRINCIPLES, Draft No. 2, supra note 7, at 19, 61–64. 
 96. Dinwoodie, supra note 29, at 24. 
 97. It is also worth noting that while the act of state doctrine has been 
routinely invoked in U.S. courts to justify refusal to adjudicate foreign trade-
mark actions, the application of this principle here seems somewhat mis-
placed.  Traditionally, this doctrine has been employed to prevent a court re-
viewing uniquely governmental and sovereign acts of a foreign state, for ex-
ample the conduct of its national security or foreign policy.  Clearly, in this 
context, a state may understandably resent the intrusion and scrutiny of a 
foreign court, but the determination as to whether a private party is entitled 
to sue to protect registered trademark rights would seem much lower down 
the scale of sensitivity.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The “collision” between the national law of trademarks and 
the borderless Internet domain name system has led to many 
complex disputes before national courts.  In an entirely domes-
tic dispute—between two parties with places of business in the 
same country, concerning local trademark rights—questions of 
personal jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement of judg-
ments do not arise.  The introduction of the cross-border ele-
ment, however, creates problems for domestic courts.  Not only 
should the interest of the foreign party be taken into account 
but also the interest of foreign states, when the forum court’s 
holding may encroach upon their jurisdictional and legislative 
competence.   
In some decisions, great respect has been paid to the foreign 
interests implicated in the litigation, but in other cases courts 
have assumed jurisdiction or applied local law in almost 
mechanistic fashion with little regard for the foreign dimension.  
This unilateralist tendency is justified in the case of abusive 
and bad faith conduct by foreign users of marks, but is much 
less acceptable where the user is simply pursuing a genuine, 
parallel business under the mark in another country.  This lat-
ter situation, which appears to be the most common type of 
cross-border Internet trademark dispute, calls for restraint and 
sensitivity in assumption of jurisdiction and application of local 
law.  Recent technological developments may be available to 
help courts in this respect by encouraging them to give a limited 
territorial effect to any orders they impose.  Such an approach, 
based on respect for foreign interests and rights, would seem 
both necessary and desirable, at least until a truly global 
trademark regime emerges. 
 
